Human Rights Overview |
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I. This section of the web site will deal with human rights problems in different parts of the world. Like the rest of the site, the section will be built rather slowly over time. In a generic sense, the peoples of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, who are in the main, the subject matter of Cultural Anthropology have, for the most part, had a very rocky past 200 years. Almost without exception, they have been victimized by colonialism in one form or another, faced expropriation of lands, and genocide. Much has been written about this, especially since the past 40 years or so when it was no longer fashionable to defend colonialism. Yet colonial or neo-colonial type tragedies continue pretty much all over the world. They vary in degree to the unspeakable bloodshed and repression of a Guatemala and El Salvador, the cynical and pervasive repression of a Mobutu or the corruption of a Marcos in the Philippines. Whether it is the impact of miners and loggers eating up the Amazon and destroying native peoples there in the process or in the torture chambers of untold numbers of countries run by petty tyrants (themselves often supported financially and politically by this or that western government), the pattern of suffering continues. In much of the African continent what might be called the colonial legacy lives on well into the independence period. Forms of outright colonial domination have been replaced by more subtle, indirect forms which often have as their target the control of economic structures. II. The human rights emphasis of this web page will begin with the situation in Tunisia. I will very likely expand the field of interest here over the next few years to include other countries in the region. (Algeria and Morocco- which together with Tunisia make up what is called The Magreb are likely additions). In terms of the colonial experience, particularly cruel were the French campaigns to colonize North Africa in the 19th century, especially in Morocco and Algeria where the pacification programs took decades and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of North Africans and more French soldiers than France would like to admit. Tunisia had an easier time of it. Decolonization was especially traumatic in Algeria which experienced one of the cruelest attempts of any European country to cling to colonialism anywhere in the world. Of a population of 8 million people, the French, in one of the worst acts of modern barbarism still generally not well known, slaughtered a million Algerians in a war that lasted 8 years from 1954-1962. Again, Tunisia by comparison faired much better, although there was some bloodshed (Bizerte) accompanying to transition to Independence.While colonialism is over in these countries the colonial heritage lingers. Over time I want to explore the Moroccan and Algerian realities on this website too, but for starters, let us begin with Tunisia. Tunisia is a largely Arab-Muslim country of 17 million people in North Africa which gained its independence from French colonialism in the 1950s. It has an extraordinarily rich and culturally textured history going back for many millenia. I had the good fortune to live there for two years (1966-1968) when I worked for the Peace Corps as an English teacher in Tunis with a rather large continent of other volunteers. The idea of the web site, is to 1. inform students of the particular forms that human rights violations take in Tunisia. This article serves as a kind of background and general introduction to the subject. 2. Hopefully do something about it (although I am rather sanguine about the possibilities) 3. to give back to the Tunisian people a tiny bit of what they gave to me in those two impressionable, pivotal years.. At first glance Tunisia is a curious choice for a human rights focus. Indeed a number of colleagues from my Peace Corps days suggest it inappropriate for various reasons. The country boasts the highest GNP per capita in Africa and has probably the most educated population with illiteracy rates very low. Health services compared with the rest of the continent are not bad at all and the condition of women in the country is unique - in a positive way - in the moslem world. Furthermore, some say, whatever the human rights problems in the country, they pale in contrast to the great tragedy that has unfolded in neighboring Algeria. All this is true, albeit in a certain sense overstated. For example, on the economic front, evidence continues to surface suggesting that the Tunisian economic miracle is tempered by the fact that it is more and more debt driven and is heavily tourism-based. Take away some of those IMF loans and at least a part of the miracle unravels. Tourism is a fickle industry which responds not only to economic cycles but political developments, ie. war, threats of terrorism, etc. Regional economic imbalances abound with the southern (Gabes, Medinine) and southwestern (Kasserine) regions of the country suffering from high, almost chronic unemployment rates especially among high school and college graduates and the general standard of living in these areas far below that of the Tunis metropolitan region. There are questions as to what degree, if any, the current government has contributed to all the country's success, if at all. A number of reports, papers, suggest that in the past few years overwhelming economic power has concentrated in the hands of 12 families either of or close to the current president to a degree that makes even past corruption and cronism pale in comparison. Furthermore, although Tunisia has not endured the excruciating internecine violence of its western neighbor, Algeria, it is ironic that a number of human rights organizations, among the Human Rights Watch, point out that when it comes to press freedoms, Algeria's press is far more open than that of Tunisia. There is a persuasive argument that most of these achievements are a result of the vision of the country's first leader, one Habib Bourguiba, who ruled the country from its independence in the mid 1950s until he was removed from power by his Interior Minister, one Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, a man with very good relations with the US intelligence services and US Defense Dept (note: this is a fact, easily proven - its significance is less clear). No doubt Bourguiba had his limitations. He was far from a model of democratic restraint or openness. He targeted his political opponents - real and imagined - and they suffered political repression accordingly. I remember well in the days I was in Tunisia, people being smeared as `Baathists' (related to the Syrian Baath Party) and purged in a typically Middle Eastern McCarthyite fashion (including the husband of the directrice of the school where I taught). When Tunisian students demonstrated against the war in Vietnam in early 1968, the crackdown was nothing short of ferocious and of a nature that American student protestors rarely experienced (with the exception of Kent State). Yet Bourguiba was a clever fellow and while repression was one of the little goodies in his political bag of tricks, the repression (comparatively speaking) was limited in scope and form. He constantly fluctuated between using the carrot and stick and to a degree unknown any where in the Arab world (with the possible exception of Lebanon before its civil war), some genuine political openness existed in the country. It had one of the only independent trade union movements in the region and its press was one of the most open in the Arab world and dissent, if not enjoyed, was often tolerated. Nor did Bourguiba did escape the psychological diseases common of people in power. Modesty did not figure into his mental make up, and, a la Kim Il Sung or Mobutu, he created a personality cult around himself which only intensified with time along with a growing intolerance to criticism. I suppose in a certain sense it's hard avoid being something of a megalomanic when you control the purses strings of power. It seems to rot the brain. Bourguiba had himself called `le supreme commandant', his picture hung in every coffee house, food store, john and in many homes. In his later years he spared himself few luxuries and his overpriced palaces dotted the Tunisian landscape at taxpayer expense. Unfortunately over time such approaches backfire and often with a vengeance and it did in Bourguiba's case And yet the man was no lightweight, either intellectually or politically. He shrewdly avoided some of the main pitfalls that plagued other nations decolonizing. For example, after a brief flirtation with creating heavy steel industry (Tunisian-manufactured hammers had a way of breaking on the nails they hit), mercifully for the country, he abandoned that approach, probably saving Tunisia from the dubious honor of becoming the `Bulgaria' of North Africa. He emphasized developing `human capital' and as a result Tunisians are among the most educated (and culturally sophisticated) people in Africa. He saw a place for women in the economy (in the textile industry) and pushed through the most liberal woman's right legislation in the Arab world, unparalleled even today, to help achieve these goals. And while he was politically tied to the west, most especially France and the USA, he balanced that off with good diplomatic and economic relations with Eastern Europe which were unusual for the Cold War Period. While I have no problem in looking at the Bourguiba years with a critical eye, I think -warts and all - that Habib Bourguiba's overall achievement in his political career will be recognized by experts and historians. True enough, as he became more and more senile, the possibility of replacing him became greater and greater. Here, Bourguiba - like in a Greek tragedy, was doomed by his own limitations, again, limitations common to those in power. For 30 years he had used political talent of others pitting one aspirant against another and then disposed of them all one after another, - although here again, rarely it seems by assassination. (Compare this to Hassan II of Morocco, Khaddafi of Libya, Saddam Hussein of Iraq all of whom tracked down regime critics and offed them with some regularity). But this brand of suspiciousness and jealousy took its toll: Bourguiba failed to create an experienced trained leadership cadre to replace him when the time came opening up the door to the kind of mediocrity that followed. The ruling Neo-Destorian Socialist (using `socialist' in the title was an in thing to do in the early post war period) Party was never permitted to develop its own leaders, platform etc. - ie. it was another top down command style operation. Furthermore, that tendency to surround oneself with neophytes and `yes' men rather than independent thinkers who would challenge him led Bourguiba - like Brezhnev - to be seriously cut off from reality in his later years. In the last years (1980-1986), he pretty much lost control of the situation and more and more of the political shots were called by a few of those who had wormed their way into his confidence and took advantage of his growing dementia and mental unbalance. Among the wormier of these worms was one Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, his Minister of the Interior, who would, seemingly with US support (one of the true Darth Vador's of American politics - Vernon Walters, was a big Ben Ali supporter) overthrow Bourguiba in a bloodless coup in November, 1987. Ben Ali's story is common enough - that of a thug with cunning who worked his way up the system by marrying the daughter of a prominent military person in Bourguiba's government and milking that relationship for all its worth to advance his career, a kind of Horatio Alger for military and security personnel the world over despairing over the path of advancement from the barracks and torture chambers. As in so many mafias, Fortune 500 companies and old style communist parties, Ben Ali specialized in kissing up to those above him in power and bullying those below him, a near fool proof way of getting ahead in modern bureaucratic structures. Concerning his depth of character, political savvy, etc. the US folksinger John Foster has a song that seems to sum the man up rather neatly: `beneath his surface there's just more surface...' Although he didn't have what it takes to get a high school diploma Ben Ali did have the street smarts to work the system well and advance through Tunisia's security bureaucracy. Along the way it appears that he spent 20 months of training at a US military installation in Baltimore. I would like to enlighten you more on the nature of his Baltimore training and the kinds of long-term connections made there, but am not in a position to do that as of yet. (More on this later as the facts - those stubborn little thorns - become available.) In any case, Ben Ali's crowning moment came when Bourguiba appointed him Minister of the Interior. It was at this point that the man's true talent and genius came to the fore and the level of domestic repression increased exponentially far beyond Bourguiba's `traditional' levels. Ben Ali also carefully positioned himself for that final half mile when he could seize power from what was now the not-so-supreme-and-increasingly-senile commandant. The actual seizure of power was quite simple. Ben Ali essentially bullied a few doctors into declaring that Bourguiba was mentally incompetent and then his security forces did the rest. He'd lined up the military pretty well (all the generals except one, whom, if I recall correctly, was quickly dismissed afterwards) and a few other key movers and shakers and then simply moved into Bourguiba's office and expropriated the presidency for himself. Just what foreign powers knew about the plan is unclear but only a sucker would believe they - the USA and France in particular - were totally ignorant of the pre-coup maneuvres. Again here we have an interesting story that some talented journalist will perhaps some day uncover. `Whatever', it is rather striking how quickly the Reagan Administration moved to recognize and bless what was essentially - despite its description as `the jasmin revolution' as a coup d'etat. Minor detail of course. The French, not exactly slouchers themselves when it comes to international political deviousness and covert activity, worried that Ben Ali was too much of a Washington man, waited a bit longer before uncorking their bottle of champagne and celebrating the changing of the guard. But eventually, they too, accepted `the new realities'. But perhaps not as much. It is curious just how much hard-ball criticism of Tunisian political developments finds its way into the mainstream French press, again a curious phenomena whose significance one can only speculate upon. Concerning this `American connection' whatever its actual nature, I've thought on the subject some. Although there are some economic interests involved, to spend too much time and energy barking up this tree seems a waste of time. Tunisia would like to pawn itself off as a kind of economic bridgehead for America and the European Union to the Middle East and Africa but it is geographically too far from the action in the heart of the Middle East and `natural resource impoverished' to play that much of an economic role. It is true that today it is benefitting greatly from the economic isolation of its two neighbors - Algeria and Libya, but here again, there are limits to what the US can gain economically wooing the Tunisian leadership. The same can be said of foreign investment and US corporate presence there. It exists, in part stimulated by the educated work force, closeness to European markets, but the small population base in Tunisia and throughout the Magreb somewhat limit its scope. So I presume other factors are at work and important ones at that. Three in particular: 1. for many years, certainly during Bourguiba's time, Tunisia played an important political role for the United States in Middle East politics, especially where it concerns the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tunisia was something of a diplomatic runner and an important one for the US, in a region where its popularity has been rather thin for most of the post war era. This role continues to the present. The recent warming up of Tunisian diplomatic relations with Israel is a case in point. 2. Tunisia is being groomed, along with a number of sub-Saharan African countries (Uganda, Nigeria, possibly also Egypt come to mind) for a long term security (read military intervention) role in Africa. The idea is basically, that despite the rhetoric to the contrary and that as foreign aid cuts vividly indicate, the US really doesn't give much of a damn about Africa, certainly not enough after the fiasco in Somalia, to send troops. The image of the citizenry of Mogadishu dragging the bodies of slaughtered US rangers through their streets seemed to revive in Washington that subconscious disease called the `Vietnam Syndrome'. Far better to use `allies' armed and trained more and more by former US military personel now turned corporate mercenaries and send these people of color into the breech in defense of the big oil and mining companies than to send more US military personnel home in body bags. Anyhow, the security relations and military cooperation deserves our undivided attention. 3. Finally, of less importance but still not irrelevant, it has been something of a national political sport to take great pleasure in cutting into, even a little, the French sphere of influence, or giving the impression of doing so. How much of this was at work when the US decided to back Ben Ali is not clear but I think the theory hangs together rather well. I am most open to other explanations of the US-Tunisian relationship except for that pathetic and patently false one that argues we (the US government) did it because we support democracy. Gimme a break. In any case, Ben Ali's accession to power was greeting warmly in Washington and, it seems, Langley Virginia. Back to the Jasmin coup d'Etat of November 1987, its fulfillment had a curious impact on Tunisia. It was welcomed with a general and deep satisfaction that seemed to cut across all class, clan and professional lines. And the hope that the change generated cannot be exaggerated. For many in the country late 1987 and early 1988 were greeted as nothing short of the dawn of a new political age. They were right, but unfortunately not in the sense that they had hoped. And here lies the deeper tragedy of what would unfold in the country over the next two years. The change - even in the form it took , a coup d'etat - inspired the hope, certainly encouraged by the pronouncements of Ben Ali himself, of a new era in Tunisian society. The hope was for a democratic opening, a kind of Tunisian glasnost that would broaden the political participation of Tunisians as a people in all aspects of life. And those first weeks after the coup, Ben Ali created a two tract system of - as they say in US basketball - faking to the left while moving unswervingly to the right. He encouraged the spirit new optimism (ie. he made a lot of promises to alot of people on the sly) while immediately and systematically concentrating more and more real power in his own hands, Had Ben Ali matched his deeds with actions, Tunisia would perhaps today be engaged in what might have been one of the most interesting social experiments of this century a transition towards both modernism and democracy. I know, this sounds a bit overstated, but I believe it. It might have provided a model not only for economic development (without oil interestingly enough) of a Middle Eastern- African country but of political progress and democratization as well. I wouldn't call it `socialism' but whatever it was or could have been, its potential was great and in a certain sense, limitless and unique - unique because it was based on neither a traditional US or former Soviet model of development. Furthermore it would have served as an exemplary model of democracy in the Arab world, a dangerous example perhaps for regimes of both left and right political persuasion. But such a qualitative leap was predicated upon broadening Tunisian democracy. Unfortunately it appears that such a course of action was completely beyond Ben Ali's competency and predilections and what Tunisia got instead was simply a dose of another Third World dictatorship `a la Singapore' - or perhaps closer to home `a la Morocco' of King Hassan II. The honeymoon between Ben Ali and the Tunisian people lasted a paltry year and a half or so. What derailed the democratic project ironically was a national election, one called by Ben Ali himself to cement public support to his presidency. There is little doubt that he would have won and won big, such was his popularity at the time. Yet it was just at this moment that the still unelected president chose to tighten the screws on Tunisian political and civil society. Ben Ali and his supporters argue that the regime argue that as the 1989 election approached that Tunisian Islamic fundamentalists (influenced by those in Algeria, Afganistan, etc) threatened to disrupt the process and seize power. Hardly. No serious political observer of Tunisian politics believes this now, nor did they in 1989 and for a number of reasons. Yes, Tunisia had and still has its fundamentalists. In the era of the collapse of the credibility of Socialism, should we be surprised that peoples turn to religion - whether it be orthodoxism in Russia or Islam in the Moslem world. Be that as it may, Tunisia's islamic fundamentalists have never enjoyed the level of support in the country that they do elsewhere in the region. And here, the country can probably thank Bourguiba's achievements which minimized the impact not only of islamic groups but also the Tunisian left. The economic structural crisis exists in Tunisia but is milder than virtually anywhere else in the Middle East. Tunisian women, enjoying social and political rights for 30 years (in 1989) were less than thrilled with a `Taliban-like' Tunisia and have become something of a social force limiting such developments. The kind of landslide support for islamic fundamentalism that emerged in Algeria in the 1991 election there, simply did not exist in Tunisia. Here the utter failure of the Algerian Revolution to deliver the goods on its promises of economic and social progress and greater democracy stands out in contrast with Tunisia's achievements. The social base for a broad fundamentalist movement which existed in Tunisia's western neighbor simply did not exist from Tabarka east. Furthermore, Tunisia's fundamentalists had to make adjustments, reluctantly perhaps, to the country's basically secular political realities. These included publicly rejecting armed struggle, accepting political pluralism and the softening of some of Islam's more medieval aspects as practiced in that great bastion of islamic conservatism, Saudi Arabia. Analyses I have read about the situation in the Tunisia suggest that in an election at that time fundamentalists would not have won more than 20% of the vote and that most of the other political parties and social formations in the country would have stood firmly behind Ben Ali, including the trade unions and the left parties. But having been pretty much pickled in the undemocratic traditions of the secret service and the military, it was all but impossible for a Ben Ali to make the change and there is nothing to indicate that he especially tried. The authoritarian reflex was simply too deeply ingrained. The kind of political maneuvring (short of simply crushing the opposition), compromise and management of a multi-party democracy was simply beyond his meager mental means and vision-less outlook. Unfamiliar with democratic struggles he was incapable of assessing the `islamic threat' to his presidency, exaggerated it all out of proportion and in an act combining personal paranoia with his deeper, dictatorial spirit, he canceled the election on the pretext of that the islamic boogey man was coming to take him and the country away. But this was just the beginning of the democratic unraveling of a kind of Tunisian McCarthyism was in the making. It would target not only fundamentalists but all other political tendencies other than his own. Liberals and leftists of all kinds, actually anyone opposing government policy on virtually any grounds soon found themselves watched, harassed, incarcerated, and broken. In a few years, according to Amnesty International, the size of the secret police was increased 4 fold over what it had been in Bourguiba's time. Bourguiba did send political prisoners into the Sahara, but evidence of his having used torture is rare (in contrast to the present regime which is accused of it by human rights organizations with great frequency). Nor did he systematically attack family members of human rights activists and political opponents, again, a now common place procedure in the country. So within a few years, the hope of democratic renewal was replaced by a blanket of repression, fear and cultural stagnation. A budding civic society was intimidated into near silence. In the summer of 1992, I got a fascinating glimpse of these dynamics. I had attended a meeting in Bruxelles of the European Movement of Nuclear Disarmament, the famous END movement, which it seemed was breathing its last breath. There , I met a a French specialist in Mediterranean affairs, one Bernard Ravenel, whose book (in French) Mediterranee: Le Nord contre le Sud (L'Harmattan 1990) is still worth reading despite being ten years old. Well connected with the North African communities in Paris, and hearing of my interest in meeting Tunisians in Paris, he invited me to attend a meeting of the Tunisian community there where the human rights situation - already a crisis - was to be discussed. I jumped at the chance and after driving with Ravenal what seemed to be forever to a remote part of the city, I walked into one of the more fascinating political meetings I have ever attended. A panel included a representative of the Ben Ali government, Tunisian islamicists, Tunisian leftists and human rights activists. The place was packed with perhaps 150-200 people. As the conversation swayed back and forth from French (which I understand with no problem) and Arabic (which I would like to understand but really don't) I was able to pick up a good deal of what was going on in the room. Ben Ali's Boy took the party line: he admitted that there was repression but basically argued that it was necessary to counter an islamic threat, and that the constitutional rights of islamic fundamentalists were legitimately suspended because they represented a threat to the existing order. He stuck to his line and defended it, trying to bolster his position by speaking of the other `achievements' of the Ben Ali government, most especially the economic progress. No one in the audience took his bait, to the contrary, they raked him deservingly over the coals. As the conversation deepened though, I was especially impressed, not so much with the other speakers, who parroted their own party lines, but with the audience. It turned out that very few of them were actually islamic fundamentalists, but they were ardent in the defense of fundamentalists in Tunisia sharing the same democratic rights as others. They seemed instead to be a product of the very secularized islamic society infused with the values of the French Revolution that Bourguiba had tried to build. Their commitment to Tunisia, to democracy and the courage with which they expressed these convictions were deeply moving. I left with a sense of hope and of confidence in the people in that room that I can remember clearly even today. And for what it is worth eight years later, I thank Bernard Ravenel for having asked me to come along. Since that evening in 1992, the human rights situation in Tunisia has seriously worsened. As I intend to detail these developments in future articles and translated communiques I will pass over them for the moment only to mention, they are, if anything, far more serious than is generally acknowledged here in the USA. Last October (1999) Ben Ali was re-elected to the presidency by 99.44% of the vote, a cynically high, frankly not credible percentage. The election rules were gerrymandered to insure an overwhelming Ben Ali vote. A couple of token opposition candidates, one who said he was just running for the fun of it, were thrown in for Western consumption. Shortly thereafter, to celebrate his victory Ben Ali released 1,000 political prisoners from jails in Tunisia. This was in large measure a response to growing criticism of his regime in Europe, especially in France. A few weeks before the election, one of the most stinging indictments yet of Ben Ali's presidency appeared in print, Notre Ami Ben Ali by Jean-Pierre Turqot and Nicolas Beau (Decouverte - 1999). Combine that with the reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch on the Tunisian human rights problems and a chilling picture emerges which punctures the idyllic image of the country the foreign office in Tunis and certain Tunisian booster organizations (The Hannibal Club USA for example) would like to paint. Pressure from within the European Union for Tunisia to democratize was also a contributing factor. Just at the time the Turqot Beau book appeared a group of former Peace Corps Volunteers from Tunisia here in the USA that I belong to, Friends of Tunisia, deadlocked over an initiative to add human rights concerns to its program. More on this last little incident in a later episode. Stay tuned. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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